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a b s t r a c t
The literature in operations management has not kept up with the growing complexity of and oppor-
tunities offered by global production networks. Managers need new tools to cope with this complexity.
We propose one that is based on a model that delayers the global plant network into a set of sub-
networks on the basis of complexity and proprietary information in the products they produce and
production processes they use to produce them. This allows examining whether each subnetwork is
congruentdi.e., has an appropriate manufacturing mission and the competencies that it would need to
carry it out. We apply this tool to analyze the global production networks of ﬁve companies and illustrate
its usefulness in performing periodic audit of the global production network and identifying potential
strategic anomalies that deserve attention.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The literature in operations management, on the whole, has not
kept up with the increasing complexity of global production net-
works. After years of intense offshoring, outsourcing, global pro-
curement, and expansion into new international markets, the
global production network of a typical multinational
manufacturing company today consists of plants dispersed around
the globe, each under increasing pressure to coordinate its opera-
tions with each other and with the rest of its supply chain, which
itself is becoming increasingly more global and fragmented.
Meanwhile, the multitude of factors outside the control of the
company or the plant, ranging from changes in foreign exchange
rates and new trade agreements to emergence of new competitors
and new technologies, continue to require adjusting the structure
of these networks constantly. In addition, changes due to the ﬁrm's
own decisionsesuch as introduction of new products, entry into
new markets, mergers and acquisitions, or a shift in strategyecan
rapidly turn a well-conﬁgured network into a poor one.
An important implication of this increasing complexity is the
need for expanding the focus of research in this ﬁeld from
examining the role of individual plants in the network (Hayes and
Schmenner, 1978; Collins et al., 1989; Ferdows,1989, 1997a,b; Chew
et al., 1990) to assessing missions and capabilities of networks of
plants (Shi and Gregory, 1998; Jagdev and Browne, 1998; Karlsson
and Skold, 2007; Ferdows, 2008; De Meyer and Vereecke, 2009;
Friedli et al., 2014; Johansen et al., 2014). However, while many
scholars have recognized the growing complexity and importance
of these networks, the scholarly literature still does not offer many
tools for how to manage them. Filling this gap deserves attention.
Among the most useful tools, we believe, are those that reduce
the complexity of the network by delayering it into simpler and
more manageable subnetworks. We see a parallel between the
challenges that single plants were facing forty years ago and what
global networks of plants face today. In his seminal article, “The
Focused Factory”, Skinner (1974) observed that many plants were
trying to respond to too many manufacturing missions simulta-
neously, which made their design and management complicated
and resulted in poor compromises in achieving most of their mis-
sions. Today many global production networks are in a similar sit-
uation. They must respond to a wide range of strategic mandates,
which makes their design and management complicated, and this
complexity is exacerbated by the fact that many external factors
can impact their performance signiﬁcantly or make them evolve in
unintended directions.
Skinner suggested that the key to simplifying the design and
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management of a factory was to give it a limited and coherent
manufacturing mission. Such a factory can become “focused”di.e.,
it can align its structural elements (e.g., equipment, layout, capacity,
and process technology) and infrastructural elements (e.g., pro-
duction planning and control, quality management systems, in-
ventories, job design, and key performance measures) to
accomplish its mission effectively (Skinner, 1974). We propose the
same approach can be used to simplify the complexity of a pro-
duction network. In other words, the notion of focus, with a few
modiﬁcations, can be applied also to a group of factories that work
together to accomplish a manufacturing mission. If a complex
production network is delayered into a set of such subnetworks,
each with a coherent manufacturing mission, it will be possible to
focus each subnetwork, hence simplify its design andmanagement.
Does the subnetwork, in fact, have an appropriate manufacturing
mission and do the factories that comprise it have the requisite
competencies to accomplish it? We use the term “congruent” to
refer to a subnetwork that has both a coherent manufacturing
mission and appropriate competencies to carry it out. We
consciously did not use the term “focused” to reduce potential
confusion.
Note that a congruent subnetwork can consist of many focused
factoriesdi.e., one concept is not a substitute for the other. In fact,
they complement each other: delayering the production network
into a set of congruent subnetworks allows a higher level of analysis
that helps determining the focus of the plants in each subnetwork.
In this paper we offer a model for delayering a production
network into a set of subnetworks and assessing their congruency.
To demonstrate its utility, we apply it to analyze production net-
works of ﬁve multinational manufacturing companies. We show
that our model serves as a useful tool for answering broad strategic
questions such as:
 Are there any anomalies in allocation of products to different
subnetworks of plants?
 Do the subnetworks of plants (each producing a certain family of
products) possess the appropriate level of resources and capa-
bilities to carry out their strategic missions?
 Are the strategic missions of the different subnetworks
sustainable?
 Are the plants in different subnetworks in right places?
2. Literature review
Several overlapping streams of research provide the context for
studying global production networks. The ﬁrst stream is the rich
literature on multinational companies. In the last three decades,
research on the structure and organization of multinationals has
shifted from a focus on a hierarchical view of relationships between
the company's headquarters and its subsidiaries towards a
perspective of a web of diverse inter- and intra-ﬁrm relationships.
Theories that have been used to examine these relationships
include network theory (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Gulati et al.,
2000; Vereecke et al., 2006), evolutionary theory (Kogut and
Zander, 1993), learning organization (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995;
Grant, 2010) and knowledge transfer (Grant, 1996; Szulanski,
1996). A common theme among these theories is that multina-
tional organizations can beneﬁt greatly from transferring resources
and competencies developed in different locations within their
company.
The second stream of research, with a slightly different
perspective, is the literature on industrial networks. The focus here
is on the external, mostly vertical, networks in which the ﬁrms e
especially original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) e operate.
Relationships with suppliers (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000), sub-
contractors, and contract manufacturers (Plambeck and Taylor,
2005) have received considerable attention in recent years. At a
more conceptual level, Håkansson (1990) views the industrial
networks as interplay between actors, resources, and activities that
reside in different ﬁrms that comprise the network (where actors
have knowledge of activities and control resources, and activities
change or exchange the resources). A key implication of this
perspective, as Dekkers and Van Luttervelt (2007), Karlsson (2003),
and Karlsson and Sk€old (2007) also observe, is that manufacturing
strategy is best deﬁned in the context (i.e., industrial network) in
which the ﬁrm operates. In other words, the role of plants in the
ﬁrm's global production network extends beyond the ﬁrm's
boundaries to its level of dependence on long-term suppliers,
alliance partners, contractors, design labs, distributors, arms-length
suppliers, and other key actors in their relevant industrial net-
works. This is what Pisano and Shih (2009) mean by “industrial
commons,” and how their presence or absence can completely alter
the options for locating global production sites.
Since industrial networks in rich countries have historically
beenmore advanced, this stream of research suggests that plants in
these usually high-cost environments can beneﬁt from their
proximity to advanced industrial networks. The consensus among
these scholars is that ﬁrms should exploit the full beneﬁts of this
proximity and be very careful when considering moving such
plants offshore to low-cost environments or outsource what they
produce (Arrunada and Vazquez, 2006; Pisano and Shih, 2009;
Zirpoli and Becker, 2011). Although most of these scholars have
focused on industrial networks in the US, Europe, and Japan, their
conclusions can be applied to any industrial network, including the
more recent ones in other regions of the world, like Singapore,
Taiwan, South Korea and China.
The third stream of research, complementing the ﬁrst two, has
focused directly on the intra-ﬁrm production networks. The central
question here is how each plant can support the ﬁrm's strategy
both individually and as a part of the network. Skinner (1974), as
mentioned earlier, suggests that a coherent manufacturing mission
would allow a plant to align its structural elements and infra-
structural elements to achieve this mission effectively. Such a plant
would be focused.While theremay be situations where a plantmay
choose, or need, not be focused (Boyer et al., 1996; Vokurka and
Davis, 2000; Ketokivi and Schroeder, 2004; Ketokivi and Jokinen,
2006), theoretical and empirical investigations suggest that if a
plant can become focused, it would improve its performance
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979; New and Szwejczewski, 1995;
Brush and Karnani, 1996; Pesch and Schroeder, 1996; Bozarth and
Edwards, 1997).
Hayes and Schmenner (1978) suggest that plants in the ﬁrm's
production network can be organized along products, processes, or
a combination of the two, and discuss under what conditions a
product-oriented versus a process-oriented network would be
more effective. Ferdows (1989, 1997b) and Vereecke et al. (2006),
among others, suggest that plants in a network have different
strategic roles which deﬁne their relationships to headquarters and
to each other, as well as to other functions in the ﬁrm (especially
research and development, procurement, and distribution) and to
other entities outside the ﬁrm.
A subgroup of this stream of research uses the networkdas
opposed to plants within the networkdas the unit of analysis (Shi
and Gregory, 1998; Colotla et al., 2003; Vereecke et al., 2006;
Ferdows, 2008; De Meyer and Vereecke, 2009). An important
premise here is that intra-ﬁrm manufacturing networks can
develop capabilities that go beyond the sum of plant-level capa-
bilities. On the other hand, Lampel and Giachetti (2013) suggest
that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the ﬁrm's
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international manufacturing diversiﬁcation and its ﬁnancial per-
formancedi.e., performance declines beyond a certain point
because the production network becomes too complex to manage.
This stream of research suggests that a plant's performance should
bemeasured by its effect on the ﬁrm's production network. In other
words, measuring the performance of a plant without explicit
consideration of its effect on the performance of the rest of the
ﬁrm's production network (or at least the subnetworks that are
directly affected) can be misleading.
These three streams of research stress the importance of taking
a network perspective for managing production. However, while
they offer useful insights into the potential beneﬁts of taking this
perspective, they do not suggest many tools for how to do that. Our
model is a step in closing this gap. It is only one of several models
that managers need to manage their global production networks.
Our model can be used as a tool to perform a high-level analysis of
the network systematically. In the following sections, we ﬁrst
describe the model and then use it to analyze the production net-
works of ﬁve multinational companies. We illustrate how the
model serves as a useful tool for auditing global production net-
works and spotting potential strategic anomalies in them.
3. The model
The model is based on a framework proposed by Ferdows
(2008), suggesting that a ﬁrm's plant network can be delayered
into a set of subnetworks based on a) complexity and proprietary
design of the products they produce and b) complexity and pro-
prietary design of the processes they use to produce them. The
framework is depicted in Fig. 1. It can be applied to analyze the
global plant network of a division, a business unit or an entire
companyddepending on the level of granularity desired.
3.1. Subnetwork positions
As shown in Fig. 1, subnetworks can fall in one of the four
quadrants based on the complexity and proprietary knowledge
embedded in their products and production processes: the rooted
subnetworks, the footloose subnetworks, the process innovation
networks, and the low investment subnetworks. As we discuss
below, the position of the subnetwork in this framework provides
strong indications about its manufacturing mission and the level of
resources it needs to accomplish it.
Top-right Quadrant e Rooted Subnetworks: Subnetworks in the
top-right quadrant produce products with unique and often
advanced designs. For example many plants in a company like Intel
or Huawei are in such subnetworks. Their products usually need to
be supported by continuous research and their advanced and rather
sophisticated process technologies must also be frequently upgra-
ded (Vereecke et al., 2006; De Meyer and Vereecke, 2009; Ferdows,
2008; Pisano and Shih, 2012). They need highly skilled operators
and technicians as well as access to expertise and knowledge in
their industries, resources that are usually found more easily in
industrialized countries. These subnetworks often contain several
plants that are considered as “centers of excellence” in the com-
pany, signifying that they develop new production capabilities that
can be shared with other plants.
Plants in these subnetworks need stability. Building deep
expertise in both product and process technologies takes time and,
because the knowledge behind this expertise is usually in tacit
form, much of it must be developed locally, in interaction between
engineering and production (Pisano and Shih, 2009, 2012). There-
fore, these subnetworks must be “rooted”di.e., their plants should
stay in place for long periods. Offshored plants in these sub-
networks are among the best candidates for reshoring and out-
sourced production of products that fall in this quadrant are among
the best candidates for insourcing.
Bottom-left Quadrant e Footloose Subnetworks: These sub-
networks produce commodity-type products using production
processes that are standard in the industry. For example, many
subnetworks of plants producing products for IKEA, Dell, Levi's, or
Toys R Us, are in this quadrant. The critical mission for these plants
is usually minimizing production costs while meeting required
quality and delivery speciﬁcations; hence, being located in low-cost
environments would generally be advantageous for the plants in
these subnetworks. Since the knowledge for producing commodity
products is usually codiﬁed and well understood in the industry, it
is relatively easy to transfer production from one plant in these
subnetworks to another or even outsource it to a third party
(Ferdows, 2006). This makes the plants in these subnetworks
“footloose”. The ultimate footloose network sources all its products
from suppliers at arm's length. Hong Kong based Li and Fung, with
no factories of its own, sources many products for large retailers
from such networks.
Fig. 1. Framework for gauging plant subnetworks.
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Top-left Quadrant e Process Innovation Subnetworks: Sub-
networks in the top-left quadrant use sophisticated and proprietary
production processes to produce rather simple and commodity-
type products. For example, Nucor, a US based steel company,
produces basic steel products (like ﬂat rolls) using advanced pro-
cesses. Another example is Lego, the Danish toy producer; Lego
uses highly sophisticated molding and packing processes to pro-
duce its famous simple looking “bricks”. The critical mission for
these subnetworks is process innovation, which can be easier if
some of the plants in these subnetworks are in the sophisticated
environments usually found in industrialized countries. Since there
is inevitable leak of best practices, a proprietary process is not likely
to remain proprietary after a few years, and if these subnetworks do
not keep up with process innovation, they are likely to slip to the
bottom-left quadrant or even be closed. It is not easy to stay in this
quadrant, especially in a position far above the diagonal.
Bottom-right Quadrant e Low Investment Subnetworks: Sub-
networks in the bottom-right quadrant make mostly proprietary
products using production processes that are standard in the in-
dustry. In general, plants in these subnetworks are not a source of
competitive advantage for the company. Many subnetworks in the
pharmaceutical industry are in this quadrant. Subnetworks pro-
ducing products like Louis Vuitton bags or Bose headphones are
also often in this quadrant. The usual mission for these sub-
networks is to supply reliable quality and quantity of products at
the right time and place. Another critical mission is to reduce the
risk of leakage of the proprietary product knowledge. For example,
even if these subnetworks include plants by subcontractors and
suppliers, the company often controls or owns many of the special
tools, molds, or machinery for making its products. Still, there is
often a high emphasis placed on maintaining conﬁdentiality. This
may motivate the company to keep many plants in these sub-
networks in countries with reliable and enforceable laws, even if
they are in a high-cost environment, to mitigate the risk of losing
control of its brand image and proprietary information. Mitigating
this risk can be a strong motivation for reshoring the offshored
plants in this quadrant.
Note that this framework is different from the well-known
“product-process matrix” suggested by Hayes and Wheelwright
(1979). The axes here, for both product and process, measure
complexity and level of proprietary knowledge, whereas in the
product-process matrix the measure for process is pattern of ﬂow
(from “job shop” to “ﬂow shop”) and for product is the typical batch
size (from “one-of-a-kind” to “very large batches”). To illustrate the
difference, consider two production networks that produce cell
phones in very large quantities, one making the latest smart phone
deploying proprietary production processes and the other a low-
cost simple model using standard and commonly available pro-
duction processes. They would be on the same position on the
product-process matrix (large batch size, close to continuous ﬂow)
but on opposite ends on this framework (the network for the new
phone on top right and for the old one on bottom left).
3.2. Subnetwork stability and competency
A typical global production network can be delayered into
subnetworks thatmay be anywhere on this framework. A particular
plant can belong to more than one subnetwork if it produces
different products or uses different production processes with
varying levels of complexity and proprietary knowledge. To be
“congruent”, a subnetwork should normally be on the diagonal
(Ferdows, 2008), as shown in Fig. 2. The logic behind this stems
from the usual industry dynamics suggesting that with passage of
time both products and production processes in an industry nor-
mally move from being proprietary and complex to becoming
commonly available and standardized.
Being on the diagonal is not sufﬁcient for being congruent. A
congruent subnetwork must also have the appropriate level of
competency to achieve its manufacturing mission. Rooted sub-
networks need high levels; footloose subnetworks low levels. We
will describe how to assess and measure the competency of a
subnetwork later, but brieﬂy we are deﬁning it essentially as the
average of the competencies of the plants that comprise the sub-
network. The competency of each plant is gauged by observing the
extent of activities beyond basic production that are carried out at
the plant, especially activities related to improvement of products
and processes, development of new products and new processes,
and working with suppliers, customers and others outside the
plant.
Fig. 2 illustrates a stylized pattern of congruent subnetworks.
The template shown in Fig. 2 can help senior executives spot
potential strategic anomalies or a lack of congruency. A red ﬂag is
raised when a subnetwork is on the diagonal but its average
competency is clearly smaller or larger than suggested by this
pattern, indicating that the company may be misallocating its re-
sources. Another red ﬂag is when many plants in a subnetwork in
the bottom-left quadrant (i.e., a footloose subnetwork) are in high-
cost environments. Most likely, these plants are ﬁghting for
Fig. 2. Expected pattern of congruent subnetworks.
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survival. They need attention in the short run, andmay need radical
changes in the long run.
Subnetworks that are off diagonal should also raise questions.
Are they in such positions due to deliberate strategic choices or
gradual movements that have not been visible? For subnetworks in
the top-left quadrant, are they there because the company is
competing through unique production processes or because the
plants in these subnetworks are still using sophisticated production
processes for producing products that are no longer complex or
unique by industry standards (i.e., these subnetworks have grad-
ually moved horizontally to the left of the diagonal)? Conversely,
the subnetworks below the diagonal, are they there because their
plants are lagging behind in upgrading their production processes
for producing the sophisticated line of products that has been
assigned to them (i.e., they have moved to the right on this
framework) or the company wants to use standard and widely
available production processes for producing rather complex and
proprietary products?
3.3. The slippery slope from rooted to footloose
If the model is applied periodically, it will also allow tracking the
changes in the position of subnetworks over time. It alerts the
management to watch for the potentially slippery slope from
rooted to footloose networks. In recent years, many subnetworks
have been moving down the diagonal as a consequence of
aggressive outsourcing or offshoring. The process is usually gradual
and every step is justiﬁed by savings that can be easily quantiﬁed.
But in many cases if the total cost of these actions, including their
less quantiﬁable and long term consequences, are considered, they
may not be justiﬁed. Furthermore, a series of these incremental
decisions often limits the range of strategic options for the com-
pany, putting its once rooted subnetworks on a slippery downward
slope which can become quickly irreversible (Ferdows, 2008).
This point is receiving more attention in the last few years, and
has started a drive to reshore and insource production that had
been offshored or outsourced (De Treville and Trigeorgis, 2010;
Tate, 2014; Tate et al., 2014). However, moving up the diagonal is
much more difﬁcult than moving down. It is difﬁcult to rebuild a
rooted network because competencies accumulated over years may
have been lost in the interim. Our model can provide early warning
to allow the management stop the slide before it is too late.
In sum, our model can be used as a tool for both assessing
current congruence of the subnetworks and, when applied peri-
odically, detecting whether the subnetworks are evolving in the
right direction. It does not optimize the network nor prescribe a
design for its architecture. It is a powerful instrument to simplify
the analysis of a complex network and spot any strategic anomalies
that deserve management attention. It can also suggest, in broad
terms, whether different plants are in right placesdfor example
which of the plants in high cost environments are likely to thrive
and in the long run which ones are likely to be in vulnerable po-
sitions. We illustrate how our model helps answering these ques-
tions in the next section by applying it to analyze the production
networks of ﬁve companies.
4. Operationalizing the model
This section shows both how the model can be operationalized
and applied in practice. The ﬁve companies illustrate the range of
analysis that can be performed by applying our model. All ﬁve
companies had their headquarters in Europe, although two were
autonomous European divisions of large US multinational com-
panies (and in their cases, the term “company” refers to the divi-
sion.) We collected our data from internal company documents and
interviews with senior managers in late 2009 and early 2010. The
interviews were semi structured, each taking about two hours and
usually with two or more senior manufacturing managers in the
company.
Our analysis consisted of three steps:
I. Determining the number of subnetworks in the company's
global production network:
First we identiﬁed major product groups sold by the company,
including those not produced by the company itself. This was
usually an easy task for managers. Next we compiled the list of all
plants in the company's global production network (including the
partners and suppliers producing ﬁnished products for the com-
pany) and the location of these plants. The third step here was to
identify which plant produced products for which product group.
The three steps deﬁned the products and plants belonging to each
subnetwork.
II. Gauging the positions of subnetworks
The next task was to position each subnetwork on the frame-
work shown in Fig. 1. Placing it on the horizontal axis required
assessment of the complexity and the level of proprietary
knowledge of the representative product in the subnetwork, and
placing it on the vertical axis required assessment of the
complexity and the level of proprietary knowledge of the pro-
cesses used in producing the representative product. We used 7-
point scales (from 3 to þ3, with zero denoting the “average” in
the relevant industry) to gauge these positions. These scales are
described in Appendix A. There was generally a strong consensus
among the managers in assigning these scores for each
subnetwork.
III. Gauging competencies of subnetworks
We used the activities that were carried out at the plant site as
the proxy for the competency residing in that plant, and used a 9-
point scale to measure it: 1 signifying that the plant did essentially
only basic activities that were required for production, and 9
signifying that the plant was engaged, in addition to production, in
extensive process and product development, strong linkage with
research and development, procurement, distribution, and ﬁnal
customers. This scale is described in Appendix B.
The next step was to compute the competency of each subnet-
work. Asmentioned earlier, we took the average of competencies of
each plant in the subnetwork and we made a minor adjustment to
account for dispersion of competencies among plants in the sub-
network. The details are explained in Appendix C.
4.1. Analysis of the ﬁve cases
We present the analysis for the ﬁve companies below.
4.1.1. Company A e luggage
This company sold a large variety of luggage, ranging from
simple bags, made from standard fabrics by simple machinery to
sophisticated suitcases made from composite materials using
advanced technology and custom-made machinery. Our analysis
resulted in ﬁve congruent subnetworks shown in Fig. 3.
There are no red ﬂags. All subnetworks seem to be congruent:
they are on the diagonal with appropriate levels of competency. For
example, subnetwork A1 is clearly rooted with sufﬁcient compe-
tency. Managers mentioned that the company was developing new
process technologies in several of the plants in this subnetwork. In
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contrast, subnetworks A4 and A5 produced many simple products,
some of which had been outsourced (hence the smaller size of the
circle, especially for subnetwork A5).
Were the plants in each subnetwork in right places? The answer,
on the whole, was yes. Plants in subnetwork A1 were all in Europe,
with the most important one close to the company headquarters in
northern Europe. Given the patented and radically new products
they produced and their sophisticated production methods and
proprietary machinery and technology, they seemed to be in the
right locations even though they were in high cost environments.
On the other hand, most products in the footloose subnetworks A4
and A5 were sourced from suppliers in low-cost locations in East
Asia.
The only minor question was why subnetwork A2 had a slightly
higher level of competency than subnetwork A1. According to our
model it should not. Management explained that this was due to a
deliberate strategic choice. The company was becoming the
dominant player in the market for the product line made in this
subnetwork (only one competitor was left) and did not want to risk
any disruption of production at this time; hence it was using its
most sophisticated plant to produce this product line.
4.1.2. Company B e consumer plastic products
This company made a large variety of injection molded plastic
products for consumer markets. Fig. 4 shows the subnetwork map
for this company. The very small circle of subnetwork B4 denotes
that the entire production for this line had been outsourced,
resulting in a competency score of near zero.
Subnetworks B1 and B2 in the upper-left quadrant seemed to be
congruent. Subnetwork B1 consisted of two plants in high-cost
regions of Europe and US; these two plants were also a part of the
B2 subnetwork, but B2 also had two other plants in lower-cost
regions in Southern Europe and Africa which did not have the
same level of competency (hence a smaller circle for the subnet-
work ﬁtting its position on the framework). On the whole, the four
plants in B2 seemed to be in right places to thrive.
However, subnetwork B3 raised a ﬂag. Why did it have almost
the same competency level as B2? The answer was that the com-
pany was currently underutilizing the competencies of the ﬁve
plants in this subnetwork. But why? Why had the company not
allocated more sophisticated products for more demanding cus-
tomers to these plants and outsourced the simple products they
were currently producing? Several managers felt that this was a
reasonable question and decided to reexamine the strategy for this
subnetworkdeither move it to the right (i.e., allocate more so-
phisticated products to it) or transfer some of the resources from
these plants to subnetworks B1 or B2 (i.e., reduce the size of the
circle).
The extreme low competency of subnetwork B4 also attracted
management's attention. These products had been outsourced
because they required processes that were not found in company's
ownplants (e.g., they neededmaterials likemetal that the company
did not process or blow-molding instead of injection molding
which the plants were not equipped to do). While in recent years
the volume of these products had gradually increased, their pro-
duction strategy had not changed. Another question for the man-
agers was whether it was time to reexamine the strategy for B4 and
consider moving it up the diagonal.
4.1.3. Company C e steel products
This company made many kinds of steel products for industrial
markets in 18 plants located in 10 countries. Its global network
could be delayered into three subnetworks as shown in Fig. 5.
Subnetwork C1 produced extremely thin cables that had to be
made to exacting speciﬁcations by sophisticated and proprietary
production processes; subnetwork C2 produced slightly less com-
plex products that also required advanced and efﬁcient production
processes; subnetwork C3 produced essentially commodity prod-
ucts that could be processed on standard machinery widely avail-
able in the industry.
Although the three subnetworks were positioned fairly close to
the diagonal, they did not seem to be congruent: Competencies of
subnetworks C1 and C2 seemed to be too low and C3 too high.
Closer examination revealed that all three subnetworks had
plants with wide ranges of competencies; the plants with very low
competencies lowered the averages for C1 and C2 and the ones
with very high competencies increased the average for C3. The
primary reason for this was the strategy of setting up “satellite”
plants close to major industrial customers. Most of these satellite
plants were designed to carry out only basic production tasks,
Fig. 3. Subnetwork map for company A.
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hence scored very low for competency; they depended on a few
plants with very high competencies for new processes and new
products.
The similarity of the competencies of the three subnetworks
raised fresh questions about this strategy. Should the company
increase the competencies of at least some of the plants in sub-
networks C1 and C2 that were located in highly advanced countries
and expand their strategic roles from merely serving their local
markets? In the ensuing discussion, managers identiﬁed two can-
didates for this move: one plant in Europe close to the company's
headquarters and another one in Asia. These plants already had
somewhat higher levels of competencies than many others and
could increase them further. They could strengthen their linkages
with the company's R&D department (particularly the plant in
Europe), major suppliers of production equipment and material
suppliers, and develop new process technologies for the entire
company. If they went aheadwith this plan, the competencies of C1
and C2 subnetworks would increase, making them move closer to
being congruent.
The subnetwork C3 was different. Why were these simple
products produced in some of the company's advanced plants in
high-cost environments, especially when production of these
products could be outsourced? The answer, as a senior manager
explained, was that “We have a big fear to put our name on a
Fig. 4. Subnetwork map for company B.
Fig. 5. Subnetwork map for company C.
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product if we don't control the process, and we have sufﬁcient
production capacity in these plants to make these simple products.
(…) It does imply, however, that the [production] cost of this
product is too high just becausewemake it in expensive plants with
a lot of staff.”
While this explained the reason for this anomaly, it prompted a
discussion of a change in strategy for this product line. Given the
competencies of the plants in subnetwork C3, especially those
located in high-cost environments of Europe and US, should the
company upgrade this product line from commodity to a more
specialized line of products? This strategy promised to be more
sustainable in the long run than the present one. As a senior
manager stated, “This planwould be consistent with our company's
desire to be the market leader in this product line. It would require
technological effort, and we will have a team to look into devel-
oping new processes which will distinguish us from competition.”
If this plan was implemented, subnetwork C3 would move up the
diagonal in our model, and would become more congruent.
4.1.4. Company D e food products
This company produced a variety of food products in 42 plants
in 22 countries in Europe, US, and Asia. Some of the plants pro-
duced raw materials for other plants while others produced basic
products for both internal and external customers, and some did
ﬁnishing and packaging. Fig. 6 shows the subnetwork map for this
company.
Subnetworks D2 and D3 did not seem to be congruent: they
were off diagonal and did not have appropriate levels of compe-
tencies; even D1, while on the diagonal, seemed to have inadequate
level of competency. Why? The unique structure of the global
production network in this company was a part of the explanation.
Almost all product and process developments in this company had
been centralized in one plant close to its headquarters. Most of the
other plants had low competency scores and were essentially
dependent on this headquarter plant for all services. It was a
deliberate choice by the company to centralize product and process
development in order to make products interchangeable, to
establish global quality standards across the plants and to optimize
efﬁciency in all its plants.
Similar to Case C, this raised the question of whether the policy
of concentrating the company's technical resources for production
innovation in one plant and leaving the rest at low competency
levels was appropriate and sustainable. Managers mentioned that
the product group produced by subnetwork D1 had recently come
under pressure from competitors, forcing a move towards com-
moditizing the product, and as a consequence, putting the sub-
network D1 on a slippery slope to move down the diagonal. The
explanation for why subnetwork D3 was off diagonal was that the
products produced by this subnetwork used production processes
that were fairly standard in the industry, but the products they
produced were fairly unique relative to competitors' products
because of their special shapes and packaging.
Subnetwork D4, in the lower left quadrant, although not exactly
on the diagonal, seemed to be congruent. But high dispersion of
competency levels among plants in this subnetwork raised a
question. Closer examination revealed that most of these plants
were located in low-cost environments close to sources of raw
materials, and had low levels of competency. Only two plants in this
subnetwork had high levels of competency. They were both in
Northern Europe and carried out process engineering and optimi-
zation for all plants in this subnetwork. Given this strategy, plants
in this subnetwork, both those in low-cost and high-cost environ-
ments, seemed to be in right locations.
4.1.5. Company E e textile
This company went bankrupt in 2012 but we have included it
here to show the predictive capability of our model. In 1995, this
company had six plants, ﬁve of which were in high-cost countries.
Since all plants were producing basic products with standardized
processes, they could be placed in one subnetwork as shown in
Fig. 7a. Fifteen years later, the company had only one plant left,
located in northern Europe. By then, it produced two different lines
of products: one still consisting of the basic products, which could
easily be produced by other ﬁrms; the other consisting of fairly
unique products requiring a proprietary production process. Even
though there was only one plant, according to our model this
company was operating two clearly different “subnetworks”, as
shown in Fig. 7b.
Fig. 6. Subnetwork map for company D.
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Back in 1995, this company's single subnetwork (E in Fig. 7a)
was off the diagonal and, since it was offering products that were
being commoditized, it was under pressure from competitors in
low-cost environments. This subnetwork was on a slippery slope
that was moving it further off the diagonal to the left. There were
two rather obvious options to get closer to the diagonal: move
down by offshoring or outsourcing production to low cost envi-
ronments or move right by offering more sophisticated products.
The company could have done both by offshoring or outsourcing
production of simple products and upgrading capabilities of its
plants in the industrialized countries to produce the specialty
products. However, the company did not move decisively in either
direction. By 2010, it had introduced a new line of specialty prod-
ucts but had closed ﬁve of its six plants. The newproduct line had to
be produced in the remaining plant, but the volume was not suf-
ﬁcient to ﬁll its capacity and the plant had to use almost half of its
capacity to produce the simple product line (hence the two sub-
networks E1 and E2 shown in Fig. 7b). It should have been clear that
such an unfocused plant was likely to run into problem.
Perhaps if we had applied our model to analyze the production
network of this company in 1995, when the company still had six
plants, it could have prompted a timely discussion of the problems
and the urgency of ﬁnding a viable solution and preventing the
bankruptcy.
Fig. 7. a. Subnetwork map for company E in 1995, b. Subnetwork map for company E in 2010.
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4.2. Spotting strategic anomalies and lack of congruency
As the discussion of the ﬁve cases show, the utility of our model
is in spotting potential strategic anomalies or lack of congruency.
While the model does not prescribe solutions, it allows performing
a high-level audit to ﬂag areas that need attention and possibly new
strategies. To summarize:
a) An off-diagonal position of a subnetwork on the framework
(shown in Fig. 1) suggests a possible anomaly in the allocation of
products to plants; if this is not a deliberate strategic choice, it
needs attention.
b) An unusual size of the circle representing the average compe-
tency of the subnetwork (compared to the pattern shown in
Fig. 2) suggests lack of ﬁt between subnetwork's capabilities and
its manufacturing mission. The subnetwork may have insufﬁ-
cient or excessive levels of resources to meet its mission.
c) The position of the subnetwork in different quadrants (shown in
Fig. 1) signals a gentle alert about potential long term problems
with the locations of its plants. If many plants in a subnetwork in
the bottom-left quadrant (footloose subnetworks) are in high-
cost environments, the subnetwork is likely to run into prob-
lems in the long run. However, this would not be a concern if the
subnetwork happens to fall in the top-right quadrant (rooted
networks).
Likewise, a subnetwork that is deliberately positioned in the top-
left quadrant (process innovation subnetworks), may need plants in
locations close to rich “industrial commons” (Pisano and Shih,
2009) to facilitate access to highly skilled technicians, labora-
tories, suppliers, and key customers that help the subnetwork
maintain its advantage in process technology. Emergence of
pockets of sophisticated industrial commons around the world,
especially in East and South Asia, is prompting a fresh reexamina-
tion of where the plants in these subnetworks should be ideally
located.
Finally, for the subnetworks in the bottom-right quadrant (low
investment subnetworks), for which reliability and protection of
proprietary product information are often critical missions, plants
in risky locations should raise a ﬂag.
5. Conclusions and future research
We need a new direction for research to cope with the growing
complexity of today's global production networks. Rather than
continuing to build increasingly more elaborate optimization
modelsewhich seems to be prevalent particularly among scholars
in operations managementewe need models that can reduce the
complexity of managing these networks. The optimization models
are of course useful for solving the tactical problems in these
complex networks (for example, how to reduce logistics costs for
supplying a particular market from alternative plants). But they are
becoming less useful for answering the strategic questions about
the network. Models for optimizing the strategy for a global pro-
duction network would need to make many assumptions, quantify
a large number of intractable qualitative variables, and often rely on
complex algorithms. The result may be a sophisticatedmodel but of
questionable practical value for those who actually design and
manage these networks.
Instead we suggest providing more tools for managers to reduce
the complexity of these networks. Ironically, the simpler the tool,
the better. It seems that when faced with a complex problem,
managers prefer simple tools as opposed to complicated ones. We
consider the model we present in this paper to be an example of
how a simple tool can help managers as they tackle a complex
problem.
Our approach is to decompose the complexity into simpler
parts. The model delayers a complex plant network into a set of
subnetworks that are easier to analyze, speciﬁcally assess whether
they are congruentei.e., the subnetwork has an appropriate
manufacturing mission and the requisite level of competencies
(embedded in the plants that comprise it) to accomplish that
mission. We utilize visualization to increase the appeal and ease of
use of the model, particularly for practitioners. Visualization helps
spotting strategic anomalies, or lack of congruency, quickly and
highlights the areas that deserve management attention. The ease
of use makes the model a practical tool also for periodic audit of the
subnetworks and for tracking their evolution through time.
Like any newmodel, ours needs to be further reﬁned, tested and
extended. We see ﬁve areas for future research directly related to
this model:
First, there is a need to test the relationship between congru-
ency and long term performance of the subnetwork. This would
require, ideally, a longitudinal study of a large sample. Such an
investigation would not be easy but its ﬁndings can be conse-
quential. A stream of research in the last few decades has
investigated whether focusing a factory actually improves its
performance; we need a similar approach for investigating the
relationship between the congruency of a subnetwork and its
performance.
Second, it would be interesting to delve deeper into manage-
ment of subnetworks in different quadrants in the model. What
are the critical skills that are needed to manage a “rooted sub-
network” and how are they different from those needed to
manage a “footloose subnetwork” or a “process innovation
subnetwork”?What are the best key performance indicators for
the subnetwork in different positions on this framework? There
is much interestingwork to be done in analyzing how tomanage
the competencies in the different subnetworks or, generally,
determining what kind and howmuch attention they need from
top management.
Third, it would also be interesting to map different moves on
this framework and investigate their ease or difﬁculty. For
example, the slippery slope from rooted to footloose subnet-
work suggests that it is easier to move down the diagonal than
up. If this is empirically validated, then senior management
should be particularly careful if they detect a downward move.
Fourth, an intriguing question is whether thismodel can provide
an indication of the role of manufacturing in the ﬁrm's business
strategy. For example, does presence of more congruent sub-
networks in a ﬁrm's global production network suggest a more
important role for manufacturing in the ﬁrm's business strat-
egy? Or, does presence of many subnetworks in the low in-
vestment quadrant (bottom right in Fig. 1) suggest a low role of
manufacturing in the ﬁrm's strategy? Or, if in two competing
ﬁrms, one has more congruent rooted subnetworks in its global
production network than the other, does that indicate a higher
role for manufacturing in its corporate strategy? There are many
such questions that can be investigated.
Going beyond our model, we suggest further research into
developing new approaches for reducing the complexity of global
production networks. This is important because managing them is
becoming dauntingly complicated and reversing an undesirable
change in these network is often a long, expensive, and difﬁcult
process. Sometimes it becomes irreversible, limiting the strategic
options for the company. We need more tools like the one pre-
sented in this paper to help managers spot anomalies quickly and
systematically, and take corrective action.
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Appendix A. Measures for product and process characteristics
Weused a 7-point scale to gauge the complexity and proprietary
information intensity of the products and processes. For assessing
the product characteristic, using the general guideline shown in
Table A1, managers in each company assigned a score between 3
(a product group that was clearly a commodity in the industry)
and þ3 (a product group that was clearly proprietary and complex
relative to what was available in the industry). In order to obtain
consistency in the scoring across the cases, the interviewees were
asked to provide (in addition to the scores) evidence that illustrated
their opinion about the products and the processes. In almost all
cases, we provided guidelines for how to deﬁne the relevant in-
dustry and interpret different ratings on this scale.
To assess process characteristics, we asked managers in each
company to assign a score between 3 and þ3 to indicate the level
of complexity and proprietary knowledge embedded in the pro-
duction processes of the typical plant in each subnetwork. Similar
to measurement of product characteristics above, we asked for
supporting evidence and provided advice for how to interpret
different ratings on this scale. The general guideline is described in
Table A2.
Appendix B. Measures for competency
We used a 9-point scale, shown in Table B1, to measure the
competency of each plant. This scale is based on the work done by
Ferdows (1989), Vereecke and Van Dierdonck (1999, 2002) and
Vereecke et al. (2006).
Appendix C. Computing competency of subnetworks
We computed the competency of each subnetwork by taking the
average of the competencies of plants in it. If production of a
product had been completely outsourced to arms-length suppliers,
we used a score of 0 for the competency of the “plant” that pro-
duced those products (because the competency for making those
products resided outside the ﬁrm). However, for those outsourced
products that the relationship with a supplier or contractor went
beyond arms-length to collaboration in tooling, customization,
design and process improvement, we assigned a higher score up to
1.5. If in a subnetwork, some products were produced in-house and
some had been outsourced, we took the weighted average (by the
proportion of production volumes) of the average competency of
company's own plants in the subnetwork and the average compe-
tency for the outsourced products in this subnetwork.
We also made minor adjustments to reduce the effect of
dispersion of levels of competencies among plants in the same
subnetwork. Wewanted to differentiate between two subnetworks
for which theweighted average of competencies of their plant were
the same (say 5) but one consisted of plants with fairly similar
levels of competencies (say between 4 and 6) and the other of
plants with very different levels of competencies (say between 1
and 9). We wanted to make a minor adjustment in the scores to
make the weighted average of the former subnetwork to be slightly
higher than the latter (arguing that the combined competencies of
the plants in the former subnetwork was likely to be slightly more
than that of the latter). In the ﬁve cases, this adjustment had
Table A1
Scale for assessing product characteristics.
Commodity products Complex and proprietary products
Very infrequent introduction of new products
Very few marginal changes made in existing products
Product design is basically simple and well understood in the industry
Standard and widely available raw materials and components
Few variations and choice of features, shapes, colors, materials, etc.
Very frequent introduction of new products
Very frequent major changes in product, differentiating it from competitors products
Complex product design
R&D-intensive materials and components
Many variations, choice of features, complex shape, special materials, etc.
Table A2
Scale for assessing process characteristics.
Standard production processes Complex and proprietary production processes
Production know-how is highly codiﬁed and widely available in the industry
Production can be easily and quickly transferred from one plant to another
Changes in production processes are very infrequent
Process innovations are rare
Most process technologies are developed outside the ﬁrm
Equipment and machinery are highly standardized
Production know-how is mostly in tacit form
Level of experience can differentiate the process between competitors
Transfer of production from one plant to another is difﬁcult
Process innovation is frequent and highly emphasized
Signiﬁcant new process technologies are developed in-house
Signiﬁcant portion of equipment and machinery are designed in-house
Table B1
Scale for assessing plant competency.
Level of competency Score
The main goal of the plant is “to get the products produced”. Managerial investment in the plant is focused on running the plant efﬁciently. 1
2
Plant has sufﬁcient internal capabilities to develop and improve its own components, products and production processes 3
4
Plant is a focal point in the company for the development of speciﬁc important components, products or production processes 5
6
Plant develops and contributes knowhow for the company 7
8
Plant is a “center of excellence”, and serves as a partner of headquarters in building strategic capabilities in the manufacturing function 9
K. Ferdows et al. / Journal of Operations Management 41 (2016) 63e74 73
negligible effect for most and only a small effect for a few sub-
networks. (We used a technique similar to calculation of the “Gini
Coefﬁcient” for income inequality for gauging the inequality in com-
petencies in plants in a subnetwork and used it to adjust the average. A
technical note explaining the details can be obtained from the
authors.)
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